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Modeling the Public Health System Response to a
Terrorist Event
Donald W. Schaffner*
INTRODUCTION
When seeking to model the response of the public health
system to a terrorist attack on the food supply, it is logical to
use the tools of risk analysis. The field of risk analysis is
commonly divided into three separate but overlapping areas:
risk assessment, which seeks to address the magnitude of the
risk under consideration and the factors that raise or lower the
risk; risk communication, which addresses the tools and
techniques needed to talk about the risk in question with
affected individuals (e.g. the general public, the food industry,
regulatory agents, etc.); and finally risk management, which
determines what can be done about the particular risk in
question and which course of action is generally best,
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considering the needs of all affected individuals. 1
The objective of the Public Health Response Modeling
research group is to develop a mathematical model that
describes the behavior of the public health system in response
to a contamination event. 2 Ideally, the model we develop
should also be able to predict the effect of interventions (e.g.,
food recalls or advisory messages). Although our model is being
developed to specifically address deliberate contamination of
the food supply, it may also be useful for accidental
contamination, such as in the recent Escherichia coli O157:H7
contamination of bagged spinach. 3 This mathematical model
will be a useful tool for policymakers seeking to understand the
importance of various factors governing the response of the
public health system to the microbial contamination of the food
supply.
CURRENT MODEL DETAILS
The current version of the mathematical model was
created using the risk modeling program Analytica® (Lumina
Decision Systems, Los Gatos, CA). 4 The model predicts a
scenario that unfolds over fifty days, consisting of sixty “doseevents” (i.e. contaminated servings of food).
When a
contaminated serving is consumed, the simulated victim has a
single probability of becoming ill, and that illness may be one of
three severity levels determined randomly by the model.
Figure 1 shows a series of screenshots from the model. Panel A
represents the overall structure of the model showing the five
modules that compose the complete model. Each of these
module nodes is depicted as a rounded rectangle with a thick
border. This thick border indicates that each of these nodes
contain additional levels of detail. The arrows connecting the
nodes indicate that information from one node is being used to
calculate values in another node.
1. See generally Thomas E. McKone, Overview of the Risk Analysis
Approach and Terminology: The Merging of Science, Judgment and Values, 7
FOOD CONTROL 69 (1996).
2. A contamination event would be an event where pathogenic microbes
were allowed to contaminate a food product, either through an accident, or
through deliberate introduction by a terrorist.
3. See U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Spinach and E. coli
Outbreak, http://www.fda.gov/oc/opacom/hottopics/spinach.html (last visited
Jan. 20, 2007).
4. Lumina
Decision
Systems,
What
is
Analytica?,
http://www.lumina.com/ana/whatisanalytica.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2007).
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FIGURE 1: SCREEN SNAP SHOTS SHOWING FOUR DIFFERENT AREAS OF
THE ANALYTICAL® MODEL
A. Overall Model

C. Medical Attention

B. Public Health Response

D. Cluster Detection

For example, information from the Dose-Response node and the
Medical Attention nodes are used in calculations in the Cluster
Detection node. Panel B shows the details of the Public Health
Response part of the model, while Panels C and D show details
of the Medical Attention and Cluster Detection parts of the
model respectively. As noted for Panel A, the arrows represent
mathematical links between the different values, so in Panel C,
“Lag in Seeking Medical Attention” and “Seeks Medical
Attention if Ill” are both used to calculate the value of “Day
Medical Attention Sought”. In some cases arrowheads without
connecting lines are shown. These represent inputs or outputs
to or from other nodes outside the current module used for
calculations. For example, in Panel C, “Day Medical Attention
Sought” plus another node, outside the “Medical Attention”
module to calculate the value of “Case Examined”.
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Furthermore, the value of “Case Examined” is used to calculate
“Total Cases Examined to Date” as well as another node
outside the “Medical Attention” module. In Panels B-D the
trapezoid shapes indicate that these variables are constants
that are set by the user prior to running the simulation. The
oval shapes are “chance” nodes that take on a different random
value for each iteration of the simulation, while the rounded
rectangles with thin borders represent “general” variables.
These are intermediate variables, whose values are not set by
the user and may or may not be probabilistic. The other
features (nodes, modules, arrows, shapes, etc.) allow the user of
the software to navigate through the model and see explicitly
how different calculations are made.
The simulation uses a “detection constant” to determine
whether the public health system has or has not detected that
an outbreak occurred. The equation that determines the
probability of outbreak detection is:

p =1−ed∗twc
Where “p” is the probability of detection, “e” is the base of
the natural logarithm (2.71828...), “d” is the chosen value of the
detection constant, and “twc” is the total number of (weighted)
cases experienced to date in the simulation. The cases are
weighted by severity of the illness; mild cases are weighted less
than moderate cases, which are weighted less than the most
severe cases. A detailed example showing the effect of different
cases severities is provided in the results section below, but
when the detection constant is low (e.g. 0.1) and the total
weight cases is also low (e.g. 0.2, a small number ill, with mild
symptoms), then the probability of detection would be one
minus “e” raised to the power of -0.1 time 0.2 or about 0.02, or a
one-in-fifty chance of detecting the outbreak. On the other
hand, with a high detection constant (e.g. 1) and the total
weighted cases is high (i.e. 1, meaning one very sick person),
the probability of detecting the outbreak rises to more than
50%.
Although it is not yet implanted in the current version of
the simulation, ideally the detection constant would be related
to the specificity of symptoms experienced by the victims. In
other words, some pathogens have a unique set of symptoms
(e.g., Clostridium botulinum with symptoms of weakness and
vertigo, followed by double vision and difficulty in speaking and
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swallowing 5 ) very different from typical food borne disease
symptoms of vomiting and diarrhea. These unique symptoms
make it easier to detect outbreaks of certain types of food borne
disease over others. Incorporating a measure of the specificity
of symptoms in the detection constant should improve the
accuracy of the model, so that for example, an outbreak which
consists of ten cases of botulism is much more easily detected
than an outbreak with ten cases of mild diarrhea caused by
Salmonella.
RESULTS
Graph 1 shows the relationship between the probability of
detection over time and a mixture of illness profiles for three
different situations: all mild illnesses, all serious illnesses and
the baseline scenario with a mixture of illnesses (60% mild
illness, 30% moderate illness and 10% severe illness).
GRAPH 1. THE PROBABILITY OF
OF ILLNESS PROFILES

DETECTION FOR A MIXTURE

0.20
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All mild
All serious

Probability of detection

0.16
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0.08
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0.00
0
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20
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In the baseline scenario the maximum probability of detecting
the outbreak occurred at day ten, with a probability of about
16%. It should be noted that because the detection probability
5. U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Food borne Pathogenic
Microorganisms
and
Natural
Toxins
Handbook,
http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/~mow/chap2.html (Jan. 1992 with periodic updates).
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is evaluated each day, the probability that the illness will not
be detected becomes smaller and smaller over time. As
expected, in those situations in which the mix of illness severity
becomes more serious, the probability of detection rises more
rapidly. When all of the illnesses are serious, the probability
that the outbreak will be detected peaks after eight days,
instead of ten. When the illnesses are all mild, the detection
probability peaks after thirteen days.
It is interesting,
however, that even in the most severe situation, it still takes
eight days for the probability of detection to reach its peak and
probabilities of detection are always quite low at the beginning
of an outbreak. This length of time is attributable to the
number of delays inherent in the system, such as: the
incubation period in each person, delays in seeking medical
attention once the illness manifests, and delays in transmission
of the medical information to public health officials.
Graph 2 shows the relationship between probability of
detection over time and the value of the outbreak detection
constant “d” noted in the equation above. The figure compares
three different values for the detection constant: a baseline
value (-0.5) representing on average ten cases needed to detect
an outbreak a sensitive value (-5) representing on average only
a single case needed to detect an outbreak, and an insensitive
value (-0.05) representing on average one hundred cases
needed to detect an outbreak.
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GRAPH 2. PROBABILITY OF DETECTION FOR VARIOUS
VALUES OF THE OUTBREAK DETECTION CONSTANT
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While making the model more sensitive to the detection of
an outbreak, an average of one out of ten cases needed to
trigger detection might be expected to significantly raise the
probability of outbreak detection; the simulation results
indicate that this may not be the case. As noted in the
discussion of Graph 1 above, the delays inherent in the system
prevent immediate detection, regardless of sensitivity to cases.
Likewise, raising the number of cases needed to trigger
detection has only a very slight effect on the day at which the
probability of detection is at a maximum. This is likely because
the number of simulated doses (in this case sixty) still result in
a significant “signal” reaching the public health system. As
noted above, even if the probability of detection on any given
day is low, the chance of repeatedly failing to detect an
outbreak falls dramatically the longer the outbreak goes on.
These results show that even with a simple model, the
simulation has the important ability to assist in reasoning
through the implications and consequences of our assumptions
about how the public health system might be expected to
behave. We do, however, acknowledge that this model is still a
preliminary one and needs a significant number of refinements
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before it matches what most public health officials would
consider the real world. The remainder of this paper will focus
on enhancements to the model that are planned for the near
future.
IMPROVEMENTS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
The model described above includes many assumptions
about the public health system that can be refined through the
addition of more realistic public health data. Two different
approaches are being used at this time: (1) expert elicitation,
which uses expert opinion (from carefully designed
questionnaires) to fill in needed gaps in the assumptions used
in the simulation, and (2) the addition of real public health
data. In the latter case, few data are available, but one notable
exception is the Enteric Disease Investigation Timeline Study
(EDITS). 6 A brief summary of the EDITS data is shown in
Table 1.
TABLE 1. EDITS DATA SUMMARY 7
Onset of Illness
Specimen Collection
Date
Initial Report Date
State Report Date
Isolate Submission
Date
PFGE Set Up Date
PFGE Sub-typing
Date
Interview Date
Total observations
Complete records, all
dates

Salmonella
328
479

Shigella
162
194

Campy
145
174

E. coli
163
175

Listeria
31
36

258
196
441

99
94
165

117
96
91

55
32
160

19
13
24

117
351

35
114

0
0

79
147

0
19

225

98

105

154

21

537
3

253
0

251
0

188
8

45
0

The database contains information on five pathogens:
Salmonella, Shigella, Campylobacter, Escherichia coli O157:H7
6. See generally CRAIG HEDBERG, COUNCIL OF STATE AND TERRITORIAL
EPIDEMIOLOGISTS, THE ENTERIC DISEASE TIMELINE STUDY (2005), available at
http://www.cste.org/pdffiles/2005/EDITS-final-report.pdf.
7. Id.
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and Listeria monocytogenes. For each of these five pathogens,
the database contains information from real-world cases in six
states. That real-world data contains:
• The date of illness onset;
• The date a fecal specimen was collected;
• The date an initial report was filed;
• The date a report with the state health department
was filed;
• The date a fecal sample isolate was submitted to the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
for entry into PulseNet; 8
• The date that genetic fingerprinting, called Pulsed
Field Gel Electrophoresis (PFGE), was set up by the
CDC, the date the genetic fingerprinting was
complete; and
• The date the affected individual was interviewed by
state or local epidemiologists.
Although this database is state of the art and quite extensive,
it should be noted that because it contains real-world data, it is
by its very nature incomplete, and although it contains over
one thousand records, only three records are fully complete and
contain information on all eight types of data.
Graph 3 shows three representative examples of frequency
distributions for three different steps in the timeline for a
salmonellosis outbreak investigation from the enteric disease
timeline study database.

8. See Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
http://www.cdc.gov/pulsenet/ (last visited Jan. 20, 2007).

PulseNet,
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GRAPH 3. REPRESENTATIVE EXAMPLES OF FREQUENCY
DISTRIBUTIONS FOR THREE DIFFERENT STEPS IN A
SAMONELLOSIS OUTBREAK TIMELINE
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It is clear from the data shown in the top panel that, in the
case of Salmonella, the time from obtaining a specimen until an
organism is isolated follows an essentially normal distribution,
with an average of about one week. In almost no cases does it
take longer than two weeks to obtain an isolate. The time from
when this isolate is obtained until it is sub-typed is more
variable, as shown in the middle panel. In this case the subtyping is most commonly completed within three days, but the
average time to completion was closer to two weeks, with some
samples not typed until three or more weeks after isolation.
Finally, the bottom panel shows that the time from disease
onset until the patient is interviewed is highly variable, with
an average time to interview of about eighteen days, but with
some interviews taking place after two days, and others not
completed until three or four weeks after disease onset.
The analysis depicted in Graph 3 can be repeated for the
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other organisms in the EDITS database and for the timelines
described in Table 1. Although not presented here, EDITS
found that E coli O157:H7 cases are reported one to three days
sooner that Salmonella cases, 9 consistent with the predictions
of the model, based on severity of illness. The EDITS study also
predicted the timelines observed in the reporting of cases
associated with the recent spinach outbreak. Thus, this real
world dataset can, with careful review and analysis, become
part of the data used to enhance the current simulation model.
OTHER IMPROVEMENTS
As noted above, the model does not currently distinguish
between pathogens with a unique signature (like C. botulinum)
and others that present as more classical food borne pathogens
(like Salmonella). The addition of a pathogen signature
variable to flag distinct pathogens easily would be an important
enhancement to the model.
Another important aspect of the public health system,
which is not currently considered in the model, is the ability of
the hospitals and other health care providers to react to
epidemics. One member of our team works for a large
Minnesota hospital, and her objective in the coming year is to
add data on the hospital system capacity to the model. This
enhancement will allow us to consider the mitigating effects of
various interventions on public health, such as ventilator
capacity or anti-toxin availability in the case of a C. botulinum
outbreak.
A third enhancement to the model that we envision over
the next year will be the addition of time dependent feedback
on the model predictions, so that as a simulated event unfolds
on the computers, the effect of various interventions (i.e. recalls
or announcements from public health officials) can be
considered. We also hope to further model the effect of various
messaging strategies through data provided via collaboration
with risk communication researchers at the National Center for
Food Protection and Defense.
SUMMARY
The model presented here is still a work in progress and
we still require more realistic public health data, more
pathogen specific data, and the ability to model the mitigating
effect of intervention, but in the end we hope that our finished
9. HEDBERG, supra note 6, at 3.
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product will be useful in optimizing the performance of the
public health system.
Through the data presented here we hope to have
illustrated that mathematical modeling can be a useful tool in
solving public health problems because is helps to pinpoint
uncertainties or knowledge gaps, while at the same time
serving as a tool for investigating the impact of potential
changes to the system.

